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Deterring Innovation:
New York v. Actavis and the Duty to
Subsidize Competitors Market Entry
Joanna Shepherd*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines a relatively new business strategy in
the pharmaceutical marketproduct hopping or product
replacementin which brand pharmaceutical companies shift
their marketing efforts from a drug nearing the end of its patent
period to a new, substitute drug with a longer patent life. In
July 2015, the Second Circuit issued an opinion in the first
appellate case addressing pharmaceutical product replacement,
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC. This Article
explains that product replacement is the predictable business
response to the incentives created by patent law and state
substitution laws, and withdrawing an obsolete product from
market when there is a new and improved version is clearly
within the patent rights of a patent holder. However, in New
York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, the Second Circuit
ruled that such product replacement activities are exclusionary
and produce anticompetitive effects. The Courts decision creates
a duty for brand drug companies to continue selling obsolete
drugs after patent expiry in order to allow generic competitors to
take advantage of automatic substitution laws. Although the
court intended this new duty to benefit consumers, the actual
effects of the ruling are likely to be the opposite. Requiring
pharmaceutical companies to continue marketing obsolete drugs
will reduce incentives for innovation and will likely increase
health care spending in the long run.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2015, the Second Circuit issued an opinion in New
York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC that, if left
undisturbed, will reduce incentives to innovate in the
pharmaceutical industry.1 In the casebrought not by a
competitor, but by the New York Attorney Generalthe court
upheld an injunction that required a brand pharmaceutical
manufacturer to continue manufacturing and selling an
obsolete drug in order to help future generic competitors.2 This
unprecedented duty requires brand drug companies to operate
their businesses in a way that lowers future profits. Although
the court intended this new duty to benefit consumers and
lower health care spending,3 the actual effects of the ruling are
likely to be the opposite. Requiring pharmaceutical companies
to continue marketing superseded drugs will reduce incentives
for innovation and will likely increase health care spending in
the long run.
Since 2004, Forest Labs, a subsidiary of Actavis, has sold
its patented Namenda IRa twice-a-day Alzheimers drug.4 In
2013, Forest began concurrently marketing patented Namenda
XRan improved once-a-day treatment.5 As the end of
Namenda IRs patent approached in 2015, Forest announced
1. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir.
2015).
2. Id. at 643.
3. Id. at 661.
4. Id. at 64647.
5. Id.
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that it planned to withdraw Namenda IR, hoping to switch IR
patients to XR.6 However, before Forest could withdraw IR, the
district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring Forest
to continue selling the superseded IR until one month after
generics entered the market.7 The Second Circuit upheld the
injunction, concluding that Forests product hop had
anticompetitive and exclusionary effects on competition and
increased the probability that Forest would maintain its
monopoly power after the patent period.8
In reality, Forests replacement of Namenda IR with
Namenda XR was the predictable business response to the
incentives created by patent law and state substitution laws.
The arduous Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval
process costs brand companies an average of $2.6 billion to
bring a new drug to market.9 Patent law incentivizes this new
drug development by granting an exclusive patent period
during which the brand company can charge higher prices to
recoup these exorbitant costs.10 However, only twenty percent
of marketed brand drugs ever earn enough to recoup their
costs.11 Moreover, as the patent period expires, brand
companies face the likely loss of eighty to ninety percent of
their sales to generic versions of the drug under state
6. Id. at 648.
7. Id. at 64950.
8. Id. at 65458.
9. Joseph A. DiMasi, Dir. of Econ. Analysis, Tufts Ctr. for the Study of
Drug Dev., Briefing: Cost of Developing a New Drug, at 5 (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Tufts_CSDD_briefing_on_RD_cost_study_-
_Nov_18,_2014..pdf.
10. See generally C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemleya, Earning
Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 947 (2011) (The Hatch-Waxman Act gave additional
protection to the inventors of new drugs, both by lengthening patent terms
and by providing guaranteed periods of data exclusivity.).
11. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS OF AM., 2015 PROFILE
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY 1, 3536 (2015),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015_phrma_profile.pdf (Only 2
of 10 marketed drugs return revenues that match or exceed R&D costs.); cf.
JOHN A. VERNON & JOSEPH H. GOLEC, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION:
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS, ECONOMIC REALITIES, AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 7
(2008), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/-pharmaceutical-price-
regulation-public-perceptions_113401853979.pdf ([E]ven after launch, only
about 30 percent of new drugs eventually earn back their investments.). See
generally Jospeh A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of
Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION
ECON. 469 (2007) (discussing R&D costs in drug development).
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substitution laws.12 These laws allow, or even require,
pharmacists to automatically substitute a generic equivalent
drug when a patient presents a prescription for a brand drug.13
In contrast to brand companies that spend billions of
dollars bringing a drug to market and tens or hundreds of
millions more marketing the drug, generic companies have a
truncated FDA approval process that typically costs only one to
two million dollars.14 Moreover, because generics are
automatically substituted for brand prescriptions, generic
companies typically spend very little on advertising.15 Instead,
generics free-ride on the marketing efforts of brand companies
and rely on automatic substitution laws for a large chunk of
their sales.
Instead of continuing to market drugs after the patent
period expires and handing over eighty to ninety percent of
their sales to generic competitors under state substitution laws,
brand companies often decide to shift their marketing efforts to
a new drug which can serve as a substitute for the drug about
to go off patent.16 This conduct is sometimes derogatorily
referred to as product hopping or product switching.17 In
this Article, I use the term product replacement to recognize
that, in many situations, brand pharmaceutical companies are
12. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 647.
13. Id. at 64445.
14. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECY FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S.
DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS
(2010), http://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/expanding-use-generic-drugs#11
[hereinafter HHS, GENERIC DRUGS]; Henry Grabowski, Patents and New
Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries,
GEO. PUB. POLY REV., Spring 2003, at 7, 13 (Generic firms can file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), a process that takes only a few
years and typically costs a few million dollars.).
15. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2009), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-
congress-2009-2010/reports/12-02-drugpromo_brief.pdf (noting that marketing
to consumers and doctors declines over a new drugs patent term, and is often
only performed by the brand firm); Melissa A. Schilling, Two Big Problems
with Generic-Drug Substitution, CNBC (June 23, 2015, 3:54 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/23/generic-drugs-hidden-costs-commentary.html
([Due] to automatic substitution, the brands marketing efforts benefit
generic drugs instead of their own.).
16. See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical
Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV.
1009, 101619 (2010) (discussing incentives and tactics used in product
hopping).
17. Id.
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replacing older versions of drugs with newly-improved versions.
The conduct mirrors the product replacement that happens
routinely in other industries, for example, when Apple
discontinues older iPhone models or Keurig stops selling older
models of coffee makers.18
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC is the first
appellate case addressing pharmaceutical product replacement.
It is also the only case where a court handed down a remedy
an injunction no less.19 The product replacement decisions in
four previous cases were on motions to dismiss or motions for
summary judgment, and the plaintiff sought only damages.20
The Second Circuit ruled that Forests product replacement
was exclusionary and produced anticompetitive effects.21 Its
decision creates a duty for brand drug companies to continue
selling superseded drugs in order to allow generic competitors
to take advantage of automatic substitution laws.22
In this Article, I argue that Forests product replacement
was not anticompetitive. It was within Forests patent rights to
stop marketing Namenda IR during its patent period, and
removing an obsolete product from market when there is a new
and improved version is not consumer coercion. After the
patent period, consumers could and would have switched to
generic IR because of the significant cost savings. Although
removing Namenda IR from market may have made
competition tougher for generics by making them engage in
18. See, e.g., Josh Dzieza, Inside Keurigs Plan to Stop You from Buying
Knockoff K-Cups, VERGE (June 30, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/6
/30/5857030/keurig-digital-rights-management-coffee-pod-pirates; Andrew
Griffin, iPhone 5c To Be Discontinued, No iPhone 6c to Replace It,
INDEPENDENT (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/iphone-5c-to-be-discontinued-no-iphone-6c-to-
replace-it-10476968.html.
19. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d. 638, 643
(2d. Cir. 2015).
20. Mylan Pharms., Inc., v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824,
2015 WL 1736957, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015); In re Suboxone
(Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d
665, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F.
Supp. 2d 146, 14749 (D.D.C. 2008); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 409 (D. Del. 2006).
21. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 65458.
22. Id. at 658 (Therefore, we conclude that . . . antitrust law requires
[Defendants] to allow generic competitors a fair opportunity to compete using
state substitution laws. (alteration in original) (quoting New York v. Actavis,
PLC, No. 14-7473, 2014 WL 7015198, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014))).
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their own marketing, it certainly did not bar generics from
several existing means of distribution. Many consumers would
have switched to generic IR to take advantage of significantly
lower prices and Forests actions would not have affected a
primary source of generics customersbeneficiaries that are
channeled to cheaper generic drugs by drug plans and
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).23
As I explain, requiring brand companies to continue selling
an obsolete drug in order to help future generic competitors
reduces incentives for innovation. Brand manufacturers are
largely responsible for pharmaceutical innovation, and policies
that punish their FDA-compliant innovation will harm
consumers health outcomes and increase medical spending in
the long run. Thus, the likely effects of New York ex rel.
Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC are the exact opposite of what
the court intended.
I. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF PRODUCT REPLACEMENT
Product replacement is the predictable business response
to the incentives created by patent law and state substitution
laws. Patent law incentivizes brand-name pharmaceutical
companies to make new drugs by granting an exclusive patent
period during which the brand company can charge higher
prices.24 The ability to charge higher prices during the patent
period is critical: it allows the company to recoup the exorbitant
costs of bringing a drug to marketwhich are estimated to
average $2.6 billion for each new drugand provides a
powerful profit incentive to innovate.25 However, as the patent
period expires, brand companies face the likely loss of eighty to
ninety percent of their sales to generic versions of the drug.26
For the majority of brand manufacturers, this means that they
will never recoup their research and development costs; in fact,
23. See Dana P. Goldman, Geoffrey F. Joyce & Yuhui Zheng, Prescription
Drug Cost Sharing: Associations with Medication and Medical Utilization and
Spending and Health, 298 J. AM. MED. ASSN 61, 6166 (2007) (discussing how
pharmacy benefit managers and health plans push beneficiaries towards
lower cost alternatives).
24. See generally Hemphill & Lemleya, supra note 10.
25. DiMasi, supra note 9 (estimating the average cost of developing a new
drug at $2.558 billion). An older study by the same authors found that it cost
over $1 billion to bring a drug to market. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 11.
26. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 647.
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eighty percent of marketed brand drugs never earn enough
sales to cover these costs.27
Despite spending hundreds of millions of dollars promoting
and marketing their drug,28 brand manufacturers expect to lose
eighty to ninety percent of their sales after patent expiration
under state drug substitution laws.29 These laws, discussed
more fully in Part III, allow or even require pharmacists to
automatically substitute a generic equivalent drug when a
patient presents a prescription for a brand drug.30 Because
pharmacists generally earn a higher profit from generic
dispensing compared to brand dispensing, they have the
incentive to substitute whenever possible.31
In contrast to brand pharmaceutical companies who spend
billions of dollars bringing a drug to market and millions more
marketing the drug to prescribers and patients, generic
companies spend very little.32 Generic companies can forgo the
arduous and expensive clinical trials that the FDA requires of
new brand-name drugs, instead only submitting the results of
27. See sources cited supra note 11.
28. Brand companies spent between $103 million and $249 million on the
top 10 most heavily advertised drugs in 2014 alone. Beth Snyder Bulik, The
Top-10 Most Advertised Prescription Drug Brands,
FIERCEPHARMAMARKETING, http://www.fiercepharmamarketing.com/special-
reports/top-10-most-advertised-prescription-drug-brands (last visited Feb. 19,
2016).
29. Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirations and the
Patent Cliff, U.S. PHARMACIST (June 20, 2012),
http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/216/c/35249/-
title=Drug#sthash.kKeV00nv.dpuf (Once drugs lose patent protection, lower-
price generics quickly siphon off as much as 90% of their sales.).
30. E.g., 1976 Pa. Laws 1163 (codified at 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 960.3(a)
(2012)) (Whenever a pharmacist receives a prescription for a brand name
drug, the pharmacist shall substitute a less expensive generically equivalent
drug unless requested otherwise by the purchaser or indicated otherwise by
the prescriber. (emphasis added)).
31. Trefis Team, CVS Fortifies Its Margins by Selling More Generic Drugs,
FORBES (Aug. 7, 2013, 05:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/greatspeculations/2013/08/07/cvs-strengthens-margins-by-selling-more-
generic-drugs/#7a2836b266f8 (While higher sales of generic drugs and
dispensing rates continue to put pressure on the companys top line growth,
the trend has enabled CVS to expand its bottom line, as generic drugs offer
higher gross margins.).
32. Schilling, supra note 15 (Generics already have a huge cost
advantage over brands because they sidestep nearly all of the research and
development and clinical testing expenses of developing new drugs. And
thanks to automatic substitution, the brands marketing efforts benefit generic
drugs instead of their own.).
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bioequivalence tests.33 Whereas research and development and
the FDA approval process costs new brand drugs an average of
$2.6 billion, it only costs generics $1 to $2 million.34 Moreover,
because generics are automatically substituted for brand
prescriptions, generic companies typically spend very little on
advertising.35 Instead, generics free-ride on the marketing
efforts of brand companies and rely on automatic substitution
laws for a large chunk of their sales.36
Brand companies, understanding that automatic
substitution laws grant generics a regulatory windfall, often
have no incentive to continue marketing their drugs after the
patent period expires and generics enter the market.37 To do so
would essentially be handing over eighty to ninety percent of
their sales directly to generic competitors.38 And a perverse
consequence of the laws is that the more effective the brands
are at promoting their drug to prescribers, the more money
generics make when pharmacists substitute the brand for the
generic.
As a result of the incentives created by a patchwork of
multiple statutes, brand companies often decide to shift their
marketing efforts to a new patent-protected drug which can
serve as a substitute for the drug about to go off patent.39 To
acquire a patent and FDA approval, the new drug must be
different and innovative; for example, new versions may be
extended-release drugs that improve compliance and reduce
the likelihood of adverse events, scored versions of tablets that
allow for increased dosing flexibility, or variations in dosage
strengths that allow the drug to be used to treat new
indications.40 The brand companies hope that if they can shift
33. Id.
34. HHS, GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 14.
35. Schilling, supra note 15.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Cf. DeRuiter & Holston, supra note 29.
39. See Carrier, supra note 16 (discussing product hopping); Himanshu
Gupta et al., Patent Protection Strategies, 2 J. PHARMACY & BIOALLIED SCI. 2,
5 (2010) (Many companies holding a patent nearing expiration for a racemic
drug choose to remarket the drug as a single enantiomer under a different
patent. This process of racemic switching, allows drug companies to apply for
FDA approval of the enantiomer, before the expiration of the racemic patent,
while maintaining market exclusivity for the drug as a whole.).
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2012) (defining new drug); cf. How Drugs are
Developed and Approved, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
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many of the consumers of the original drug to the new drug,
they can keep at least some of their sales out of the hands of
generic entrants.41 Thus, incentives under patent law
incentives to innovate in order to obtain the exclusionary
patent periodmotivate brand companies to create new drugs
instead of handing over the majority of their sales to the
generic companies. As the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
has explained, these new drugs can, in turn, benefit consumers:
The threat posed to existing brand drugs by generic
competition can incentivize the brand company facing dramatic
loss of sales to develop new and innovative drugs that benefit
consumers.42
As brand companies attempt to shift some of their
customers to the new drug, their efforts are sometimes
categorized as a hard switch or soft switch.43 In a hard
switch, the brand company introduces a new drug and
withdraws the old drug.44 In a soft switch, the brand company
does not withdraw the old drug, but shifts all of its marketing
and promotion efforts to the new drug.45 The distinction
between the hard and soft switch is not always so clear. For
example, a company increasing the price of the old drug to a
prohibitive level but leaving it on the market would generally
be considered to have made a soft switch. But in reality,
making a drug unaffordable is practically equivalent to
removing it from the market.
Although product shifting is a predictable result of the
incentives created by patent law and automatic substitution
laws, it naturally frustrates generic manufacturers that can no
longer free-ride off of the marketing efforts of brand companies.
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess
/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ (last updated Aug. 18, 2015).
41. See Schilling, supra note 15; Gupta et al., supra note 39.
42. Fed. Trade Commns Brief as Amicus Curiae at 6, Mylan Pharms.,
Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 WL 1736957 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 16, 2015), 2012 WL 7649225.
43. E.g., Meg Tirrell, Why You Should Be Paying Attention to the Lawsuit
Against Actavis, CNBC (Sept. 17, 2014, 12:05 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/17/why-the-lawsuit-against-actavis-is-huge-for-
biotech-pharma-investors.html ([T]he hard switch is more effective than a
soft switch, which involves introducing the newer product without pulling the
older one from the market before generics hit.).
44. See id.
45. See id.
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As a result, the courts are beginning to see litigation in this
area; the next section discusses these court decisions.
A.NEW YORK EX REL. SCHNEIDERMAN V. ACTAVIS PLC
In the first appellate case addressing pharmaceutical
product replacement, on May 22, 2015, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis
PLC46 upheld the district courts preliminary injunction
requiring the manufacturer of a patented drug that had been
made obsolete by an improved version to nonetheless continue
selling the earlier version until one month after the expected
entry of generic versions of the original drug.47
Actavis and its subsidiary, Forest Laboratories had since
January 2004 sold Namenda IR (IR) tablets, the first FDA-
approved dementia treatment based on memantine.48 IR was a
twice-daily drug in a market where all other Alzheimers
disease treatments are administered once per day.49
Accordingly, Forest spent several years and substantial funds
to develop a once-a-day extended release capsule, Namenda XR
(XR), which was approved by the FDA in June 2010. 50
Forest began marketing XR in June 2013, over two years
before the end of the IR patent.51 Initially the company sold
both IR and XR, but tried to soft switch consumers to XR.52
Forest spent substantial sums promoting XR to doctors,
46. 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015).
47. Id. at 643. The preliminary injunction extended from its date of
issuance, December 15, 2014, through 30 days after July 11, 2015, the date on
which generic memantine would first become available. Under the injunction,
the defendant drug companies were required: (1) during the injunction term to
continue to make Namenda IR tablets available on the same terms and
conditions applicable since July 31, 2013; (2) to inform healthcare providers,
pharmacists, patients, caregivers, and health plans of the injunction and the
continued availability of Namenda IR; and (3) during the injunction term, to
refrain from imposing a medical necessity requirement or form for the filling
of prescriptions of Namenda IR. Id. at 64950. In response to the defendants
arguments that the terms of the injunction were vague, the Second Circuit
panel said it disagreed and that the injunction plainly prohibits Defendants
from charging more for Namenda IR than it did during the specified
timeframe and from restricting access to IR. Id. at 662.
48. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 64647.
49. Id. at 647.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 648, 654.
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caregivers, patients, and pharmacists.53 The company also sold
XR at a discounted rate, making it considerably less
expensive than IR, and gave rebates to health plans so that
patients would not have higher co-pays for XR compared to
IR.54 At the same time, Forest ceased actively marketing IR.55
As the end of the IR patent approached, Forest understood
that five generic versions of IR had tentative FDA approval to
enter the market on July 11, 2015, and seven others could
become available starting in October 2015, when the patent on
IR expires.56 As a result of the expected generic entry and state
substitution laws that would automatically substitute
Namenda IR for generic IR, Forest estimated that it would lose
eighty to ninety percent of its IR revenues to generics.57
As a result, Forest planned to discontinue selling IR to
deny generics the regulatory windfall created by automatic
substitution laws.58 In February 2014, Forest announced and
informed the FDA that it planned to discontinue IR in August
2014; due to a delay in the production of XR, this date was later
pushed back a few months.59 However, before Forest withdrew
IR from the market, the State of New York filed a complaint
alleging that the planned withdrawal of IR violated antitrust
laws. Forest subsequently entered into an agreement with a
mail-order-only pharmacy to provide for limited access to
Namenda IR if medically required.60 The court determined
that despite this limited availability of IR, Forests planned
withdrawal of IR constituted a hard switch.61 In December
2014, the district court granted New Yorks request for a
preliminary injunction.62 Defendants appealed the preliminary
injunction and the Second Circuit granted expedited review.63
The Second Circuit concluded that Forests planned
replacement of Namenda IR with Namenda XR violated section
2 of the Sherman Act.64 It determined that Forests hard switch
53. Id. at 648.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 647.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 648.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 648, 651.
62. Id. at 64950.
63. Id. at 650.
64. Id. at 65354, 659.
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would produce anticompetitive and exclusionary effects on
competition, creating a dangerous probability that
Defendants would maintain their monopoly power after
generics enter the market.65
Certainly, neither product withdrawal nor product improvement
alone is anticompetitive. But under Berkey Photo, when a
monopolist combines product withdrawal with some other conduct,
the overall effect of which is to coerce consumers rather than
persuade them on the merits, and to impede competition, its actions
are anticompetitive under the Sherman Act. Here, Defendants hard
switchthe combination of introducing Namenda XR into the
market and effectively withdrawing Namenda IRforced
Alzheimers patients who depend on memantine therapy to switch
to XR (to which generic IR is not therapeutically equivalent) and
would likely impede generic competition by precluding generic
substitution through state drug substitution laws.66
The Courts ruling thus created a duty for brand drug
companies to continue marketing superseded drugs in order to
allow generic competitors to take advantage of automatic
substitution laws. As I discuss in Part IV, not only is this duty
in conflict with our free market principles, it could produce
disastrous long-term consequences for innovation and
consumers.
The decision in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis
PLC is the only case where a court has handed down a
remedyan injunction no less.67 The decisions in the other
cases were on motions to dismiss or motions for summary
judgment, and the plaintiff sought only damages. Below I
discuss the four product replacement cases prior to New York
ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC that generated
substantive court decisions.
B. PRIOR PRODUCT REPLACEMENT CASES
In the first case, Abbott Laboratories v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,68 the court considered defendant
brand drug company Abbotts motion to dismiss a suit by
generic drug companies.69 The plaintiffs alleged that Abbott, in
twice changing the formulation of TriCor before imminent
65. Id. at 65458.
66. Id. at 65354 (citations omitted).
67. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
68. Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 409 (D.
Del. 2006) (denying defendants motion to dismiss).
69. Id. at 413.
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generic entry, attempted to prevent automatic generic
substitution.70 Abbott engaged in a hard switch by
terminating the sales of the older versions of TriCor and
removing the prior formulations from the National Drug Data
File to prevent pharmacies from filling prescriptions for the
older versions and their generic counterparts.71
The Court denied the defendants motion to dismiss,
relying largely on the Second Circuits opinion in Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.72 In Berkey Photo, the Second
Circuit differentiated between the free choice and coercion
of consumers, and noted that because Kodak did not remove
older products from the market, the introduction of a new
product that made it more difficult for competitors to compete
was not anticompetitive.73 Teva embraced this reasoning and
refused to grant dismissal because Abbott had removed older
products from the market and national prescription
databases.74
However, the Teva decision diverged from the Second
Circuits opinion in Berkey Photo in one important respectthe
desirability of having courts balance the merits of product
innovation against the competitive obstacles created by the
innovation: [T]he Second Circuit refused to weigh the benefits
from Kodaks introduction of a new camera model and film
format against the alleged harm from the product introduction
because that weighing had already occurred in the
marketplace.75 In contrast, the court in Teva suggested that
any competitive harm from pharmaceutical formulation
changes should be weighed against any benefits presented by
the Defendants.76
Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals L.P. decided
two years after Teva, was also a ruling on a motion to
dismiss.77 Several pharmaceutical retailers had sued alleging
that AstraZeneca deliberately soft-switched the market from its
prescription heartburn drug Prilosec to the companys newly
70. Id. at 41314.
71. Id. at 416.
72. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
73. Id. at 287.
74. Teva, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
75. Id. at 421 (citing Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 28687).
76. Id. at 422.
77. Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148
(D.D.C. 2008).
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FDA-approved Nexium just as Prilosecs patent was about to
expire.78 AstraZeneca continued to manufacture and sell its
prescription Prilosec capsules, but began aggressively
promoting Nexium to doctors and ceased promoting Prilosec.79
In granting AstraZenecas motion to dismiss, the court
relied on the Teva courts differentiation between consumer
coercion and consumer choice, and concluded that AstraZeneca
added choices by introducing a new drug to compete with
Prilosec and various other heartburn medications.80 The court
also rejected the argument that the superiority, or lack thereof,
of a new drug formulation was relevant:
Plaintiffs have also not identified any antitrust law that requires
a product new on the marketwith or without a patentto be
superior to existing products. Antitrust law holds, and has long held,
to the contrary. Courts and juries are not tasked with determining
which product among several is superior. Those determinations are
left to the marketplace.81
The next reported decision, In re Suboxone, was also a
decision on a motion to dismiss.82 Plaintiffs alleged that as the
patent period for Suboxone83 was about to expire and generic
entry was imminent, the defendantbrand-name
manufacturer Reckitt Benckiser, Inc.made inconsequential
changes to the Suboxone dosage form by introducing sublingual
film to replace sublingual tablets.84 Plaintiffs also alleged that
Reckitt falsely disparaged the tablet through fabricated safety
concerns and ultimately removed tablets from the market just
as generic tablets were starting to compete.85 As a result of
these actions, the Court decided that the defendants conduct
seems to fall somewhere between that alleged in Walgreen and
[Teva].86
78. Id. at 14849.
79. Id. at 149.
80. Id. at 151.
81. Id.
82. In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naxolone)
Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
83. Suboxone is a prescription drug used for the maintenance treatment
of opioid dependence. MEDICATION GUIDE: SUBOXONE (BUPRENORPHINE AND
NALOXONE) SUBLINGUAL FILM (2015), http://www.suboxone.com/content
/pdfs/medication-guide.pdf.
84. In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 674.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 681.
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The court noted the difficulty in determining whether
product replacement is anticompetitive:
Although the issue of product-hopping is relatively novel, what is
clear from the case law is that simply introducing a new product on
the market, whether it is a superior product or not, does not, by
itself, constitute exclusionary conduct. The key question is whether
the defendant combined the introduction of a new product with some
other wrongful conduct, such that the comprehensive effect is likely
to stymie competition, prevent consumer choice and reduce the
markets ambit.87
Concluding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that
the disparagement of Suboxone tablets and false safety
concerns took place alongside coercive measures, the court
denied the motion to dismiss.88
The most recent case prior to New York ex rel.
Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Warner Chilcott Public Ltd. Co., involved a motion for
summary judgment.89 Mylan and other generic manufacturers
claimed that brand drug company Warner Chilcott and its co-
defendants engaged in a conscious strategy to prevent or delay
generic competition for branded Doryx medication.90 Doryx was
brought to market in 1985 without patent protection.91 Since
then, the defendants executed at least three product switches:
first from a capsule to a tablet, then from 75 mg and 100 mg
tablets to a single-scored 150 mg dosage strength, and finally
from a single-scored version of the 150 mg tablet to a dual-
scored version.92 With each change, Warner Chilcott eventually
ceased promoting the prior formulations and eventually
withdrew them from the market, but generally not before
Mylan began selling a generic version.93 The plaintiffs alleged
that these reformulations provided little therapeutic benefit,
but were instead intended to create obstacles for generic
manufacturers benefiting from automatic substitution laws.94
The court granted the summary judgment for Warner
Chilcott concluding that not only did the company not have
87. Id. at 682.
88. Id. at 685.
89. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824,
2015 WL 1736957, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015).
90. Id. at *5.
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id. at *3.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *5.
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monopoly power, but it did not exclude competition when they
reformulated Doryx, introduced new versions of Doryx into the
marketplace, marketed the new versions of Doryx, and
withdrew old versions.95 The court determined that defendants
did not exclude Mylan from competition:
Throughout this period, doctors remained free to prescribe
generic Doryx; pharmacists remained free to substitute generics
when medically appropriate; and patients remained free to ask their
doctors and pharmacists for generic versions of the drug . . . .
[U]ndisputed evidence shows that managed care organizations
promoted the substitution of lower-cost generics for branded
Doryx even though they are not AB-rated.96
The court also concluded that conduct that prevents
generics from taking advantage of automatic substitution laws
is not anticompetitive:
The gravamen of Mylans complaint is that Defendants
anticompetitive product changes were exclusionary because
Mylans generic would not automatically be substituted unless
Mylan redesigned the generic to match the new version of Doryx and
secured an AB-rating from the FDA. The Third Circuit has never
ruled that this kind of conduct is anticompetitive. . . .
. . . .
Here, there was no exclusionary conduct. Mylan remains able to
reach consumers through, inter alia, advertising, promotion, cost
competition, or superior product development. Mylan instead seeks
to take advantage of generic substitution laws and thus increase its
profits. Defendants have no duty to facilitate Mylans business plan
by keeping older versions of branded Doryx on the market.
Defendants certainly did not exclude competition by denying Mylan
the opportunity to take advantage of a regulatory bonus.97
Thus, there is some general consensus among the courts. A
hard switch prior to generic entry likely gives rise to an
antitrust claim, but a soft switch likely does not.98 A hard
switch after generic entry, on the other hand, likely does not
give rise to an antitrust claim.99
95. Id. at *12.
96. Id. at *13.
97. Id. at *1314 (citations omitted).
98. The courts in Teva, Suboxone, and Actavis PLC concluded that hard
switches may give rise to an antitrust claim. The courts in Walgreens and
Actavis PLC implied that soft switches likely do not give rise to an antitrust
claim.
99. The courts in Mylan and Actavis PLC suggested that hard switches
after generic entry are permitted (this is implied in Actavis PLC because the
preliminary injunction to keep Namenda IR available was crafted to expire
one month after generic entry). For another example of switching after generic
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However, there is significant tension in the treatment of
automatic substitution laws among the product replacement
cases. The Mylan court rejected plaintiffs argument that
denying generics the ability to be automatically substituted
under state substitution laws constituted exclusionary
conduct.100 In fact, the Mylan court viewed a generic drug
companys efforts to capitalize off the brand drug companys
promotion expenditures as a form of free riding, seeking to
transform its own refusal to incur promotion costs into
defendants anticompetitive conduct.101 In contrast, the courts
in Teva, Suboxone, and New York ex rel. Schneiderman v.
Actavis PLC, viewed automatic substitution as the most cost-
efficient means of competition, and obstruction of automatic
substitution as anticompetitive.102
It is critical for future courts to determine a consistent and
appropriate legal treatment for product replacement in the
pharmaceutical industry. Congress has not addressed product
replacement and the FTC is divided on the issue along partisan
lines.103 Until future courts resolve the appropriate legal
treatment, brand manufacturers operate in a world of
uncertainty and under the constant threat of litigation for
decisions they make when introducing new products.
entry, see In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litig., No. 14-
md-02505-DJC, 2015 WL 5458570, at *1213 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2015)
(concluding that defendant Medicis did not limit consumer choice because it
continued to sell older strengths until July 2011 and generic versions of older
strengths were available in 2009). However, Teva concluded that these
switches would be anticompetitive because even though plaintiffs could
market generic versions of the old formulations, they were unable to take
advantage of automatic generic substitution laws.
100. Mylan Pharms., 2015 WL 1736957, at *1314.
101. Id. at *13.
102. See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655
(2d Cir. 2015); In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naxolone)
Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 681 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Abbott Labs. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 423 (D. Del. 2006).
103. See, for example, the partisan split over submission of a recent FTC
Amicus Brief, Brief for Amicus Curiae Fed. Trade Commn Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellant, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No.
15-2236 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2015), 2015 WL 6157989. Also see remarks of recent
FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, Joshua D. Wright, U.S. Fed. Trade
Commr & Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comment Regarding the Canadian
Competition Bureaus Draft Updated Intellectual Property Enforcement
Guidelines, at 15 (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/public_statements/734661/150810canadacomment.pdf.
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL AND INDUSTRY
FRAMEWORK
Before explaining the potential consequences of the
unprecedented duty created in New York ex rel. Schneiderman
v. Actavis PLC, it is important to understand the complex
regulatory regime that governs both brand name and generic
manufacturers in the pharmaceutical industry. This section
describes this regulatory framework and discusses various
marketplace strategies that have emerged in the
pharmaceutical industry.
A. THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
requires that all drugs are safe and effective before the
drugs are marketed for sale.104 Although not statutorily
required, the FDA usually requires more than one clinical
study to support findings of safety and effectiveness.105 Due to
the rigorous scientific demands to demonstrate safety and
effectiveness, a new drug, or New Chemical Entity (NCE),
takes ten to fifteen years to develop, and the New Drug
Application (NDA) process typically costs a drugs sponsor well
over $1 billion.106
The journey to FDA approval is a long and expensive one.
Initially, pre-clinical studies are conducted with very little FDA
oversight.107 The studies are conducted in vitro or in vivo
(bench studies and animal studies, respectively) to determine
how the drug is metabolized, measure the toxicity levels, and
determine how quickly the broken-down products are excreted
104. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)
(2012).
105. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF
EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS (1998),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance%20RegulatoryInfo
rmation/Guidances/UCM078749.pdf [hereinafter FDA, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS].
106. See Jason Millman, Does It Really Cost $2.6 Billion to Develop a New
Drug?, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/18/does-it-really-cost-2-6-billion-to-develop-a-new-
drug/; see also DiMasi, supra note 9.
107. See The FDAs Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and
Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs
/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2014)
[hereinafter FDAs Drug Review Process].
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from the body after the drug is metabolized.108 If the drug looks
promising, the drugs sponsor will next submit an
Investigational New Drug Application (IND) to the FDA to test
the diagnostic or therapeutic potential in humans.109 If the
FDA approves the IND, clinical trials begin.110 Phase I trials
usually including 20 to 80 healthy subjects and lasting 1 to 3
monthsfocus on the safety of the drug and determine the
metabolic and pharmacologic actions of drugs, side effects of
increasing doses, and early evidence of effectiveness.111 Phase
II trialsusually including 100 to 300 subjects and lasting 1 to
2 yearsfocus on the drugs effectiveness.112 Phase III verifies
the drugs efficacy and safety with 1000 to 3000 subjects
suffering from the disease and lasts 1 to 4 years.113
Once all clinical trials are complete, the drug sponsor
formally proposes the drug to the FDA in a New Drug
Application (NDA).114 The NDA includes both the data
gathered during the pre-clinical animal and bench studies and
the data from the human clinical trials.115
The FDA approves a new pharmaceutical for sale and
marketing in the United States only if there is substantial
evidence of safety and effectiveness.116 Data suggests that only
around 10 to 15% of drugs that begin clinical trials are
eventually approved by the FDA.117 The most recent study to
108. Id.
109. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2015); Investigational New Drug (IND)
Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs
/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approval
Applications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/default.htm (last
updated Oct. 27, 2014). See generally U. Nitin Kashyap, Vishal Gupta & H.V.
Raghunandan, Comparison of Drug Approval Process in United States &
Europe, 5 J. PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. & RES. 131, 13132 (2013).
110. See FDAs Drug Review Process, supra note 107.
111. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a); FDAs Drug Review Process, supra note 107.
112. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b); FDAs Drug Review Process, supra note 107.
113. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c); FDAs Drug Review Process, supra note 107.
114. 21 C.F.R. pt. 314; New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess
/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications
/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2015).
115. See FDAs Drug Review Process, supra note 107.
116. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012); see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 105.
117. Michael Hay et al., Clinical Development Success Rates for
Investigational Drugs, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 40, 4041 (2014)
(evaluating data from 2003 to 2011 on success of all indications or the lead
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track FDA approval rates found the approval rate varied from
phase to phase: Phase I had a 64.5% success rate, Phase II had
a 32.4% success rate, Phase III had a 60.1% success rate, and
the FDA approved 83.2% of applications that passed Phase
III.118 Ultimately, of 100 drugs that began Phase I trials, only
10 or 15 drugs would eventually be approved.119
And even for the few manufacturers that eventually
receive FDA approval, the approval process generally takes
many years and costs billions of dollars. Data indicate that the
average drug takes over ten years to make it through the
approval process.120 Studies examining the cost of attaining
FDA approval find that it costs an average of $2.6 billion to
bring a drug to market:121 the average discovery, research, and
development process costs $1.4 billion, the cost of capital
opportunity costs are an additional $1.2 billion, and research
and development costs once the drug is approved cost $312
million.122
In contrast to the FDA approval process for new drugs,
generics face a much cheaper and quicker process. The Hatch-
Waxman Act123 in 1984 created the Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) process that greatly truncates the
approval process for generic drugs that can demonstrate
bioequivalence with the corresponding brand drug.124 Generics
that establish bioequivalence can rely on previously submitted
brand-name safety and efficacy data, and skip the most
expensive portion of the FDA approval process for brand
drugsthe clinical trials.125 As a result of the ANDA process,
indication progressing from phase 1 to approval for both new drug
applications and biologic license applications).
118. Id. at 41, 44 tbl.3.
119. Id.
120. DiMasi, supra note 9, at 18 (calculating time from initial drug
synthesis to approval at 128 months, and from Phase 1 clinical trials to
approval at 96.8 months).
121. Id. at 2023. An older study by the same authors found that it cost
over $1 billion to bring a drug to market. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 11.
122. DiMasi, supra note 9, at 2023; Millman, supra note 106.
123. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 (2012)).
124. See Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of
Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 53, 54
(2003).
125. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
2016] DETERRING INNOVATION 683
whereas research and development and the FDA approval
process costs new brand drugs an average of $2.6 billion, it only
costs generics $1 to $2 million to bring a drug to market.126
B. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, was
designed to balance the benefits of pharmaceutical innovation
with consumers needs for affordable drugs.127 It recognizes
that drug companies will only have the incentive to innovate if
they can earn enough profits during the patent period to
recover the exorbitant costs of researching and developing the
drug, getting FDA approval, and marketing the drug to
physicians and patients.128 However, while preserving
incentives for brand-name innovations, Hatch-Waxman also
encourages companies to create bioequivalent drugs
genericsthat copy these branded drugs and enter the market
as soon as the patents expire on the innovator drugs.129
Hatch-Waxman includes various provisions designed to
spur innovation by brand name drug companies. First, to help
companies recover the costs of bringing a drug to market,
Hatch-Waxman restores a portion of the patent term lost to
delays in the FDA approval process.130 It establishes a period of
patent restoration, which extends a covered drugs patent
length by up to five years (to a maximum of fourteen years) for
half of the branded drugs clinical testing period and all time
spent securing FDA approval.131 In addition, Hatch-Waxman
conferred on branded drugs five years of brand exclusivitya
prohibition against FDA approval of bioequivalent generic
drugs for a limited window to ensure brand name
manufacturers an adequate opportunity to recoup research,
development, and marketing costs.132
126. See HHS, GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 14.
127. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355); see Soehnge, supra note 124, at 5354.
128. Margo A. Bagley, Patent Term Restoration and Non-Patent Exclusivity
in the US, in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PATENT LAW
111, 111 (Josef Drexel & Nari Lee eds., 2013).
129. Id. at 11415.
130. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii); 35 U.S.C. § 156(c).
131. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c).
132. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii); see Bagley, supra note 128, at 12728.
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But in exchange for these new protections for brand-name
manufacturers, Hatch-Waxman created various incentives for
companies to produce and market cheaper, generic drugs. First,
to spur the introduction of low-cost generics, Hatch-Waxman
created the Abbreviated New Drug Application process that
allows a generic that demonstrates bioequivalence to rely on
previously submitted brand-name safety and efficacy data.133
This greatly truncated process enables generic manufacturers
to quickly enter the market after expiration of the brand-name
drugs patent. Moreover, Hatch-Waxman actively incentivizes
generic companies to challenge the validity of brand-name
patents by creating a pathway for such challenges and by
offering a lucrative incentive to the first generic manufacturer
that files an ANDA claiming that the brand patent is either
invalid or will not be infringed by the new generic (known as a
paragraph IV certification).134 If the generic company wins or
settles the patent litigation, it receives a 180-day exclusivity
period during which the FDA will not approve any other
generic versions of the druga period in which the first generic
can earn substantial profits.135
Fortunately, Hatch-Waxman appears to have successfully
increased generic drug development without significantly
133. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12) (2015).
134. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
135. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC DRUG EXCLUSIVITY
UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, &
COSMETIC ACT (1998), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs
/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf. Hatch-Waxman thus creates asymmetrical
risk/reward incentives for generic drug companies. The first generic challenger
faces little financial risk because the FDA must stay the generics ANDA,
allowing the parties to litigate before the generic drug goes to market. As a
result, regardless of the outcome of the patent litigation, the generic will not
have to pay damages for infringement because the generic drug was never sold
(relief is only declaratory and injunctive). Thus, the potential upside for the
generic is substantialit could receive the 180-day exclusivity periodand
there is very little potential downside. These perverse incentives have led to a
generic strategy known as prospectingthe filing of numerous challenges
with questionable merit with the hopes of winning just a few. See MARTIN A.
VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA AND
PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 62 (2005) ([T]he validity of
virtually all major patented drugs is being challenged not necessarily because
they are not meritorious patents, but only because that is the road to riches.
Thus major generic companies have scores of such suits ongoing and generic
companies rely on the law of averagesif you place enough bets, you are sure
to win a few of them . . . .).
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reducing branded drug innovation. By reducing both the time
and money costs for generic manufacturers seeking FDA
approval, Hatch-Waxman produced a rush of generics to
market.136 Whereas generics comprised only 19% of all drugs
dispensed prior to 1984, they now represent over 84% of
prescriptions filled.137 This surge of cheaper generic products
has produced significant savings for consumers; in the last
decade alone, generic drugs have saved the health care system
over $1 trillion dollars.138 Hatch-Waxman has also protected
the interests of brand drug companies to encourage
innovationin fact, drug research and development budgets
have increased between threefold and sixfold since Hatch-
Waxman was enacted.139 However, there is concern that
increasing patent challenges threaten brand company revenues
and decrease incentives for important innovation.140
Importantly, while Congress recognized the need to
balance incentives for brand-name innovation while increasing
cheaper generic entry in the market, Hatch-Waxman is silent
on issues of product replacement. In fact, Congress has recently
rejected an exclusivity period for product reformulations of
biologic products,141 yet has declined to restrict product
replacement among traditional brand pharmaceutical
companies. The court in Mylan argued that the Hatch-
136. See Henry Grabowski, Competition Between Generic and Branded
Drugs, in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 15355 (Frank
A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007).
137. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING:
RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 2 (2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588064.pdf; IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE
INFORMATICS, DECLINING MEDICINE USE AND COSTS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE?
A REVIEW OF THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2012, at 15
(2013), http://static.correofarmaceutico.com/docs/2013/05/20/usareport.pdf.
138. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 4.
139. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7 (2006), https://www.cbo.gov/sites
/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf.
140. See Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J.H. Graham, Balancing Innovation
and Access: Patent Challenges Tip the Scales, 326 SCI. 370, 371 (2009).
141. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-148, § 7002(a), 124 Stat. 119, 807 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
262(k)(7)(C) (2012)) (preventing new periods of exclusivity from approval of
subsequent biologics by the same sponsor within twelve years of approval of
an original biologic). See generally Henry Grabowski et al., Implementation of
the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and Policy Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.
511, 51415 (2011).
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Waxmans silence on the issue indicated Congresss
understanding that antitrust claims for product replacement
could stifle innovation: Congress certainly could have created
barriers to brand-name drug changes that could delay generic
entry, but, perhaps understanding the adverse effects this
could have on innovation, it did not.142
C. STATE DRUG SUBSTITUTION LAWS
In addition to federal regulations that incentivize generic
drug development, the states have also worked to encourage
generic entry into the pharmaceutical market with laws
requiring generic substitution.
Until the mid-1970s, almost all states required
pharmacists to dispense the exact drug that physicians had
prescribed in order to protect the public from counterfeit
drugs.143 However, as new federal laws arose to combat
counterfeit drugs, states began to enact laws allowing the
substitution of generic alternatives in an effort to curtail rising
prescription drug spending.144 Today, every state has enacted
laws that either allow or require generic substitution unless
specifically forbidden by the prescribing physician.145
The specific provisions of the drug substitution laws vary
state to state. For example, eleven states make substitution
mandatory while the other thirty-nine states and Washington,
D.C. give the pharmacists and insurers discretion over the
substitution decision.146 In addition, although all laws prohibit
pharmacists from substituting generics that are not
therapeutically equivalent to the prescribed drug, the states do
not all define therapeutic equivalence in the same way.147
Thirty states and D.C. have adopted the FDAs definition of
142. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824,
2015 WL 1736957, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015).
143. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMMN, DRUG
PRODUCT SELECTION 49, 14850, 155 (1979) (By 1972, virtually every
jurisdiction except the District of Columbia had enacted some form of
antisubstitution law or regulation.).
144. See id. at 151, 153.
145. See Eric L. Cramer & Daniel Berger, The Superiority of Direct Proof of
Monopoly Power and Anticompetitive Effects in Antitrust Cases Involving
Delayed Entry of Generic Drugs, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 81, 120 (2004).
146. Jesse C. Vivian, Generic-Substitution Laws, 33 U.S. PHARMACIST
(GENERIC DRUG REV.) 30, 32 tbl.2 (2008).
147. See id; New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638,
645, 656 (2d Cir. 2015).
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therapeutic equivalenceAB-rated in the FDAs Orange
Bookthat requires the generic to have the same active
ingredient, dosage form, strength, and route of administration
as the brand drug.148 Although the other twenty states do not
officially impose an AB-rating requirement, many require the
same degree of therapeutic equivalence for generic
substitution.149 Indeed, the drug substitution laws in sixteen of
the states either require or have been judicially interpreted to
require generics to have the same dose and/or dosage form to be
automatically substituted.150 In the other four states, there
does not appear to be such a restriction on generic
substitution.151 As a result, the Second Circuit in New York ex
rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC concluded that pharmacists
likely could substitute generic IR for Namenda XR in those
statesMinnesota, North Dakota, Vermont, and
Washington.152
The purpose of state drug substitution laws is to curtail
rising prescription drug spending and encourage generic entry
into the pharmaceutical market. These laws were originally
believed necessary because of certain distortions in the
pharmaceutical marketnamely, that the consumer who pays
does not choose, and the physician who chooses does not
pay.153 It was believed that because patients can only obtain
prescription drugs with a prescription, but physicians have
little incentive to consider the price of the drug that the
patient, or in most cases a third-party payor, will pay, there is
a price disconnect in the market.154 States believed that drug
substitution laws would correct this disconnect by allowing
pharmacists to substitute cheaper genericspharmacists have
the incentive to substitute because they typically earn higher
148. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 656; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEPT OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS viix (35th ed. 2015).
149. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 65657, 657 n.33.
150. Id. at 657 & n.33.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.21 Subd. 3 (West 2011); MINN. R.
9505.0340 Subp.3(H) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-02.1-14.1(3), (1)(g) (2015);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4605(a), 4601(4) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
69.41.120, 69.41.110(4) (West 2015 & Supp. 2016). There is some uncertainty
over whether Oklahoma would also be included in this group.
153. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., supra note 143, at 23.
154. See generally Carrier, supra note 16, at 101719.
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profit margins on generic drugs as a result of health plan
incentives.155
However, state drug substitution laws achieve these goals
by enabling generics to free-ride off their brand name
counterparts.156 Brand name manufacturers engage in
extensive marketing efforts, often spending hundreds of
millions of dollars to promote their drugs to physicians157 and
to the general public.158 When generic drugs are automatically
substituted for brand drugs under state substitution laws, the
generic companies reap the benefits of the brand companies
marketing efforts without bearing the costs.159 Whats worse,
this generic free-riding on brand marketing costs comes on the
heels of generic free-riding on brand research and testing costs
under the truncated approval process created by Hatch-
Waxman that allows generic manufacturers to rely on brand
manufacturers previously submitted safety and efficacy data.160
D. STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY THIRD-PARTY PAYORS
The pharmaceutical market has changed dramatically
since state substitution laws were originally enacted.
Prescription drug spending grew substantially from the 1970s
to around 2003.161 During that time, pharmacy benefit
managers (PBMs) and insurers adopted various benefit
changes and tools designed to steer patients to less-expensive
alternatives.162 Multi-tiered formularies, selective contracting,
mail-order pharmacies, and mandatory generic substitution
under many health plans are just a few of the developments
that have transformed the benefit landscape.163 These tools
have successfully curtailed the growth in prescription drug
155. See id.
156. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 65657.
157. Estimates suggests that pharmaceutical companies spend almost
$100,000 in marketing efforts for every 11 practicing physicians in the United
States. Abigail Zuger, Fever Pitch: Getting Doctors to Prescribe Is Big
Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999, at A1.
158. Brand companies spent between $103 million and $249 million on the
top-10 most heavily advertised drugs in 2014 alone. Bulik, supra note 28.
159. See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 65657.
160. Id. at 644.
161. Murray Aitken, Ernst R. Berndt, & David M. Cutler, Prescription
Drug Spending Trends in the United States: Looking Beyond the Turning
Point, 28 HEALTH AFF. w151, w151 (2009).
162. Goldman, Joyce & Zheng, supra note 23, at 61.
163. Id.
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spending and, as a result, have diminished the contribution of
state substitution laws to keeping drug prices low.164
Of prime importance, many plans have successfully
reduced drug spending by substituting generic drugs for brand-
name drugs when clinically appropriate.165 Data indicate the
drug plans and PBMs have achieved a rate of generic
substitution of over eighty percent.166 Because generics
generally cost eighty to eighty-five percent less than their
brand name counterparts, generic substitution has produced
considerable savings for consumers.167 In fact, in 2010, the FDA
estimates that generic substitution reduced prescription drug
spending by over $150 billion.168
In addition, most beneficiaries are now covered by tiered
formulariesa list of approved or preferred drugs for the
health plan.169 Beneficiaries are given incentives such as lower
copayments or coinsurance to use generic drugs or the
formulary brand drugs.170 Because formulary status can
greatly influence a manufacturers sales of a drug, PBMs and
insurers are able to negotiate significant discounts in exchange
for a formulary listing.171 Inclusion on the formulary is
determined largely by costs; every year insurers and PBMs
refuse to include many drugs in the formularies because of high
cost.172 The use of formularies has significantly reduced
spending on prescription drugs; for example, one of the largest
164. See generally id. at 65 (summarizing the overall decrease in
pharmaceutical spending associated with various cost sharing and benefit
plan changes).
165. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING PHARMACY
BENEFIT MANAGERS ON HEALTH PLANS, ENROLLEES, AND PHARMACIES 14
(2003), http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-196.
166. FED. TRADE COMMN, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF
MAIL-ORDER PHARMACIES 62 (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/reports
/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf.
167. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FACTS ABOUT GENERIC DRUGS (2012),
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafe
ly/understandinggenericdrugs/ucm167991.htm.
168. Id.
169. See Fed. Trade Commn, Letter to Assembly Member Greg
Aghazarian, Cal. Gen. Assembly 6 (Sept. 7, 2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040027.pdf.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 67.
172. See, e.g., Tracy Staton, Express Scripts Stiff-Arms AZs Onglyza,
Vivus Qsymia with New 2016 Formulary, FIERCEPHARMA (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/express-scripts-stiff-arms-azs-onglyza-
vivus-qsymia-new-2016-formulary/2015-08-03.
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PBMs, Express-Scripts, has reported that its formulary will
save its 25 million covered Americans $1.3 billion in 2016
alone.173
Once on the formulary, drugs are assigned to one of several
tiers based on their cost to the health plan.174 For example,
whereas a non-formulary drug may cost a beneficiary $100,
drugs in the generic tier of the formulary could cost $10 and
drugs in the brand tier of the formulary could cost $30. The
tiered copayments and coinsurance give beneficiaries a
powerful incentive to use generic or low-cost brand-name
medications.175
In addition to discounts from drug manufacturers, health
plans and PBMs have been able to negotiate significant
discounts from pharmacies through selective contracting.176
Selective contracting in health care involves contractual
arrangements among insurers and health care providers that
give covered individuals a financial incentive to obtain health
care from a limited panel of providers.177 Although insurance
plans such as health maintenance organizations and preferred
provider organizations have engaged in selective contracting
for decades, only recently has the practice expanded to
prescription drug plans. The drug plans form exclusive
arrangements with retail pharmacies that promise to steer
insured individuals to in-network pharmacies.178 The
pharmacies, eager to be part of an exclusive network that will
offer significant sales, compete aggressively to be included in
the network by offering price discounts for filling
prescriptions.179 As a result, selective contracting has
significantly lowered the cost that consumers pay for
prescription drugs. In fact, compared to consumers without
coverage, beneficiaries of plans engaging in selective
contracting pay, on average, 18% less for brand-name drugs
and 47% less for selected generic drugs.180
173. Id.
174. FED. TRADE COMMN, supra note 166, at 11, 51.
175. See id. at 11.
176. Id. at 46.
177. Id. at 36.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 165, at 9.
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In addition to retail pharmacies, many health plans and
PBMs now offer mail-order pharmacy services.181 Mail-order
pharmacies can offer significant discounts for many
prescription drugs by dispensing larger quantities of the drug
and ensuring that consumers receive the cheapest drug within
a therapeutic class, which may well be a generic.182 To
encourage these savings, beneficiaries are offered incentives to
fill prescriptions through mail-order pharmacies when
appropriate.183 Consumers and health plans pay, on average,
27% less for brand name drugs dispensed from mail-order
pharmacies than non-covered consumers pay at retail
pharmacies for the exact same drugs.184 Generic drugs
dispensed from mail-order pharmacies cost 53% less than the
prices that non-covered consumers pay at retail pharmacies.185
As a result of these savings, Americans spent $80 billion on
prescription drugs from mail-order pharmacies, or almost 30%
of total retail prescription drug spending in 2014.186
Health plans and PBMs have adopted various additional
techniques to ensure that consumers obtain appropriate drugs
while saving money.187 They include therapeutic interchange to
substitute therapeutically-similar, but less-costly drugs with
physician approval,188 step therapy that requires patients to try
less expensive drugs that are often effective before the plan will
pay for more expensive drugs,189 and utilization controls that
prevent medication from being refilled too often.190 These and
other cost-saving approaches have successfully reduced
prescription drug spending for covered members.191
These innovative tools have reduced both prescription drug
spending and overall health care spending, saving Americans
181. See FED. TRADE COMMN, supra note 166, at 2340.
182. See id.
183. See, e.g., id. at 17 (noting incentives to use mail-order pharmacies
when treating chronic conditions with maintenance medications).
184. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 165, at 9.
185. Id.
186. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, MEDICINES USE AND
SPENDING SHIFTS 43 (2015), http://www.imshealth.com/en/thought-
leadership/ims-institute/reports/medicines-use-in-the-us-2014.
187. See FED. TRADE COMMN, supra note 166, at 13.
188. See, e.g., id.
189. See, e.g., id. at 1314.
190. See, e.g., id. at 2.
191. Id. at 1214.
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billions of dollars each year.192 Moreover, the price-reducing
effects of these tools have marginalized the impacts of the state
substitution laws enacted in the 1970s. In the 1970s, most
prescription drugs were prescribed by doctors that were largely
insensitive to price, methodically filled by pharmacists, and
paid for by consumers or third-party payors that had little
influence over the drug chosen or the price paid, while drug
manufacturers had enormous control over price.193 In contrast,
the market for prescription drugs in 2015 was one where the
PBMs and drug plans have harnessed the buying clout of
thousands or millions of consumers to negotiate discounted
prescription drug prices.194 PBMs and drug plans now largely
determine what consumers pay for drugs, which pharmacies
they use, and which drugs they take.195 With the development
of formularies that channel consumers to reasonably-priced
drugs, including generics wherever appropriate, PBMs and
drug plans have replaced drug manufacturers in the drivers
seat.196 Thus, whereas state substitution laws may have been
important in promoting generic entry and curtailing drug
spending in the 1970s, far more sophisticated strategies by
market participants now drive consumers to lower-priced
generic drugs.
III. THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF NEW YORK EX REL.
SCHNEIDERMAN V. ACTAVIS PLC
The unprecedented ruling in New York ex rel.
Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC dramatically changes the law
governing antitrust cases involving pharmaceutical patents. It
effectively creates a new duty for brand drug manufacturers to
continue selling superseded drugs in order to assist the
192. Estimates of the magnitude of PBMs cost-savings range from thirty to
thirty-five percent of total prescription drug spending. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT FOR MEDICARE 40 tbl.6
(2002), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3960/10-30-PrescriptionDrug.pdf;
VISANTE, INC., PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS (PBMS): GENERATING SAVINGS
FOR PLAN SPONSORS AND CONSUMERS 5 (2011), http://www.pcmanet.org
/images/stories/uploads/2011/Sept2011/pbms%20savings%20study%202011%2
0final.pdf. With total annual prescription drug spending in the U.S. currently
around $276 billion, PBMs cost-cutting tools have the potential to save
Americans billions of dollars each year. VISANTE, INC., supra, at 7.
193. See Carrier, supra note 16, at 1011, 101720.
194. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 165, at 11.
195. See FED. TRADE COMMN, supra note 166, at 14.
196. See id. at 310.
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marketing efforts of generic manufacturers.197 This section will
discuss problems with the Second Circuits reasoning and
explain the negative consequences that the ruling is likely to
produce.
A. PRODUCT REPLACEMENT IS NOT PER SE ANTICOMPETITIVE
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits companies from
using exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct to obtain or
maintain monopoly power.198 In New York ex rel. Schneiderman
v. Actavis PLC, the Second Circuit confirmed the district
courts conclusion that Defendants hard switch would likely
have anticompetitive and exclusionary effects on competition in
the memantine market, creating a dangerous probability that
Defendants would maintain their monopoly power after
generics enter the market.199
However, Forests replacement of Namenda IR with
Namenda XR would not have had exclusionary effects either
during or after the patent period. Before generic entry in July
2015, the product replacement did not exclude competition
because Forest was the sole legally-authorized seller of
memantine-based drugs and courts have long held that a
companys products are not in competition with one another.200
After July 2015, the product replacement would not have
excluded competition because seven generic competitors had
FDA approval to enter the market immediately (Sun Pharma,
Mylan, Amneal, Upsher Smith, Dr. Reddys, Lupin, and
Teva).201 Not only did these generics enter in July and August,
197. See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 658
(2d Cir. 2015) (Therefore, we conclude that . . . antitrust law requires
[Defendants] to allow generic competitors a fair opportunity to compete using
state substitution laws. (alteration in original) (quoting New York v. Actavis,
PLC, No. 14-7473, 2014 WL 7015198, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014))).
198. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
199. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 655.
200. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 77174
(1984) (holding that anticompetitive agreement or conspiracy cannot apply to
coordination between a parent and subsidiary).
201. See FDA listings of generic memantine hydrochloride in prescription
status at Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm
(search for memantine hydrochloride) (last visited Feb. 19, 2016) (showing
approval letters for entry for Dr Reddys on Apr. 14, 2010; Sun Pharma on May
5, 2010; Teva on Oct. 25, 2011; Mylan on Jan. 30, 2015; Amneal on Apr. 10,
2015; Lupin on Apr. 10, 2015; Upsher Smith on July 31, 2015; Wockhardt on
Sept. 4, 2015; Alembic on Oct. 13, 2015; Aurobindo on Oct. 13, 2015; Jubilant
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another nine generics were approved to enter the market in the
closing months of 2015.202 Forests product replacement would
not have excluded this generic entry.
Instead of excluding competition, Forests product
replacement was aimed at preventing generic manufacturers
from free-riding on Forests marketing efforts.203 The Second
Circuit rejected Forests argument that taking steps to prevent
free-riding is a legitimate business purpose because it reasoned
that free-riding behavior is authorized by law; is the explicit
goal of state substitution laws; and furthers the goals of the
Hatch-Waxman Act by promoting drug competition.204
However, the Second Circuits reasoning is based on an
incomplete analysis of the statutory goals of Hatch-Waxman.
While promoting drug competition was one of the goals of
Hatch-Waxman, so was shielding brand manufacturers from
the free-riding of generics; Hatch-Waxman provided for both a
period of patent restoration and brand exclusivity to extend
brand manufacturers monopoly rights to the detriment of
generics.205 The Mylan court recognized that protecting brand
companies profitability in order to spur innovation was a
primary goal of Hatch-Waxman:
With Hatch-Waxman, Congress sought to encourage innovation
and provide generic drug manufacturers a quick, less costly pathway
to FDA approval. Indeed, Congress sought to compensate research
on Oct. 13, 2015; Macleods on Oct. 13, 2015; Torrent on Oct. 13, 2015;
Unichem on Oct. 13, 2015; Puracap on Nov. 17, 2015; and Ajanta on Nov. 30,
2015). Of the sixteen generics that received approval from FDA in 2015, ten
had already settled patent litigation with Forest ensuring they could enter the
market under license before the patent term formally ended. Forest
Laboratories, Inc. and Merz Pharma GmbH & Co. KGaA Settle NAMEDNA®
Patent Litigation, FOREST LABORATORIES, INC. (July 22, 2010, 8:00 AM),
http://news.frx.com/press-release/corporate-news/forest-laboratories-inc-and-
merz-pharma-gmbh-co-kgaa-settle-namenda-pat; see also Actavis PLC, 787
F.3d at 647 n.16 (Defendants patents on Namenda IR prohibit generic entry
until October 2015. But in 2009 and 2010, in order to resolve patent litigation,
Forest entered into licensing agreements permitting ten generic competitors to
enter the market three months before Namenda IRs official exclusivity period
ends.).
202. See Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, supra note 201. In its
opinion issued in May 2015, the Second Circuit wrote, five generic versions of
IR have tentative FDA approval to enter the market on July 11, 2015, and
seven others may enter the market as early as October 2015. Actavis PLC,
787 F.3d at 647.
203. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 65758.
204. Id. at 657.
205. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012).
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drug companies and promote continued research amidst increased
generic competition. Yet, the Act is silent on product hopping.
Congress certainly could have created barriers to brand-name drug
changes that could delay generic entry, but, perhaps understanding
the adverse effects this could have on innovation, it did not. Courts
should not seek to substitute their legislative judgment for that of
Congress.206
The Mylan court also concluded that brand companies
attempts to prevent generics free-riding on marketing costs is
not exclusionary: Mylan thus seeks to transform its own
refusal to incur promotion costs into Defendants
anticompetitive conduct.207 Rather than incurring its own
marketing costs, Mylan, relied instead on the promotion
provided by state automatic substitution laws. Mylan is thus a
victim of its own business strategy, not Defendants predatory
conduct.208
The Second Circuit in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v.
Actavis PLC concluded that to be exclusionary, conduct does
not need to bar competitors from all means of distribution if
they are barred from the cost-efficient ones: [C]ompetition
through state drug substitution laws is the only cost-efficient
means of competing available to generic manufacturers.209
However, Forests replacement of Namenda IR with Namenda
XR does not eliminate several existing cost-efficient means of
distribution for generic manufacturers. Even if generic IR
manufacturers cannot benefit from automatic substitution
lawsfree-riding on the marketing of brand manufacturers
they can still market their own products in a cost-effective
manner by bundling marketing efforts with other generics.210
The Supreme Court has also recognized that generics are often
promoted through counter-detailing campaigns.211
Furthermore, Forests product replacement would have had no
impact on a major source of generic companies customers
beneficiaries funneled to lower cost drugs by third-party
206. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824,
2015 WL 1736957, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (citations omitted).
207. Id. at *13.
208. Id.
209. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 65556.
210. Final Form Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 48, Actavis PLC, 787
F.3d 638 (No. 14-4264) [hereinafter Brief of Defendants Actavis].
211. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2661 (2011).
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payors powerful pricing incentives.212 This important source of
customers is not only cost-effective, its free.
Moreover, Forests replacement of Namenda IR with
Namenda XR would not have produced sufficient
anticompetitive effects to give rise to an antitrust violation.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that the
antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the protection of
competition not competitors.213 The Supreme Court and
several circuits have concluded that even monopolists have no
duty to help competitors: no duty to deal with competitors,214
no duty to license to competitors,215 no duty to advertise for
competitors,216 and no duty to inform a competitor of product
design changes.217 Similarly, a lawful monopolist has no duty to
help a competitor by operating in a way that could transfer
eighty to ninety percent of its own sales to a competitor.218
Making a competitor engage in its own marketing is not
anticompetitive: a competitor ha[s] no right under antitrust
law to take a free ride on its competitors sales force . . . .
Advertising a competitors products free of charge is not a form
of cooperation commonly found in competitive markets; it is the
antithesis of competition.219
The Second Circuit concluded that Forests replacement of
Namenda IR with Namenda XR prior to generic entry forced
patients to switch to the new drug, coercing consumers into
212. See discussion, supra Section III.D.
213. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
214. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commcns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448
(2009) (As a general rule, businesses are free to choose the parties with whom
they will deal, as well as the prices, terms, and conditions of that dealing.);
Verizon Commcns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
41011 (2004); In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 13435 (2d
Cir. 2014); In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 2007).
215. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1209 (2d Cir. 1981).
216. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377
78 (7th Cir. 1986).
217. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir.
1979).
218. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655 (2d
Cir. 2015); see also Verizon Commcns Inc., 540 U.S. at 41011, 41516 (The
Sherman Act . . . does not give judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist
alter its way of doing business whenever some other approach might yield
greater competition.).
219. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co., 797 F.2d at 37778; accord Abcor Corp.
v. AM Intl, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 929 (4th Cir. 1990) (The plaintiff had no right
to free ride on the sales force of the defendant.).
2016] DETERRING INNOVATION 697
taking the new drug.220 But companies are allowed to remove
obsolete products from the market when there is a newer
replacement; certainly manufacturers of cars, cell phones,
computers, or countless other products would not be accused of
coercing consumers when they stop marketing older models
in favor of newer models. And after July 2015, consumers
would have had the choice to switch from Namenda XR to
generic IR. And many consumers would have switched to
generic IR. The prices for generic IR are significantly lower
than for Namenda XR; for example, Costco Pharmacy sold 60
tablets of 10 mg generic IR for $24.44 compared to $362.13 for
the equivalent 30 capsules of Namenda XR 28 mg.221 And the
FDA-approved label confirms that switching between XR and
IR is safe and simple,222 and hundreds of thousands of patients
have switched with no problems.223 Moreover, third-party
payors provide powerful incentives to beneficiaries to switch
from Namenda XR to generic IR; payors regularly exclude
brands from their coverage list to drive beneficiaries to lower
cost generics,224 and those payors that do include a brand drug
in their formulary will typically require a much higher
copayment than they do for the generic.225 Indeed, numerous
220. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 654.
221. Namenda® Pricing, COSTCO PHARMACY, http://bit.ly/1PXcQqN (last
visited Sept. 12, 2015).
222. Highlights of Prescribing Information, ACTAVIS (Sept. 2014),
http://bit.ly/1HN7lI6 (Patients treated with NAMENDA may be switched to
NAMENDA XR . . . .); see also Dosing for Patients Currently Taking
NAMENDA, NAMENDA XR, http://www.namendaxrhcp.com/patients-currently-
taking-namenda.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2016) (It is recommended that a
patient who is on a regimen of 10 mg twice daily of NAMENDA tablets be
switched to NAMENDA XR 28 mg once-daily capsules . . . . There is no study
addressing the comparative efficacy of these 2 regimens.).
223. See Brief of Defendants Actavis, supra note 210, at 1820.
224. See Caroline Humer, Express Scripts Excludes 20 More Drugs from
2016 Coverage, REUTERS (July 31, 2015), http://www.reuters.com
/article/2015/07/31/express-scr-savings-idUSL1N10B2JM20150731; see also
EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 2016 PREFERRED DRUG LIST EXCLUSIONS (2016),
https://www.express-scripts.com/art/open_enrollment
/DrugListExclusionsAndAlternatives.pdf (In most cases, if you fill a
prescription for one of these drugs, you will pay the full price. Take action to
avoid paying full price. If youre currently using one of the excluded
medications, please ask your doctor to consider writing you a new prescription
for one of the following preferred alternatives.).
225. See FED. TRADE COMMN, supra note 166, at 11 (On a typical 3-tier
formulary the members copayment would be the lowest for the first-tier,
which includes generic drugs; somewhat higher for the second-tier . . . ; and
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examples exist of brand companies withdrawing one drug and
introducing another before the end of the patent period, and
still losing many consumers to the generics when they entered
the market.226
Finally, Forests product replacement does not violate
antitrust law because Forest was exercising its patent rights.
For over a century, courts have held that the exercise of patent
rights is immune from antitrust scrutiny because a patent is
an exception to the general rule against monopolies,227 and as
a result, a patentees decision to exclude others from the use of
the invention, is not an offense against the Anti-Trust Act.228
And while conduct that exceeds the scope of the patent is
subject to antitrust scrutiny,229 non-use of a patent is clearly
within the rights granted by the Patent Act. It has been
settled doctrine since at least 1896 that a patent holder has
no obligation either to use [its patent] or to grant its use to
others;230 a patentee is neither bound to use his discovery
himself nor permit others to use it.231 In fact, courts have
recognized that giving patent holders the right to not use a
patent is important to encouraging innovation: a court should
not presume to determine how a patentee should maximize its
reward for investing in innovation . . . . The market may well
dictate that the best use of a patent is to exclude infringing
highest for the third-tier, which includes . . . those brand drugs with a generic
equivalent.).
226. See Brief of Defendants Actavis, supra note 210, at 53 (In 2002,
Allergan withdrew its older glaucoma treatment to favor a new version with a
different preservative; generics entered a year later and still captured a 50%
market share. In 2011, ISTA Pharmaceuticals stopped selling its twice-daily
anti-inflammatory drug, and promoted a once-daily version. Again, generics
captured significant sales after entering the market months later. (citations
omitted)); see also Douglas B. Farquhar, Judge Supports FDA Decision
Approving Generic Bromfenac, FDA L. BLOG (July 10, 2012),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/07/judge-
supports-fda-decision-approving-generic-bromfenac.html.
227. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945).
228. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co. of N.J., 247 U.S. 32, 57
(1918).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926) (It
is only when he adopts a combination with others, by which he steps out of the
scope of his patent rights and seeks to control and restrain those to whom he
has sold his patented articles in their subsequent disposition of what is theirs,
that he comes within the operation of the Anti-Trust Act.).
230. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 43233 (1945).
231. Contl Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425 (1908).
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products, rather than market the invention.232 In addition to
the courts repeated pronouncements that non-use of a patent
is within the valid rights of a patentee, Congress amended the
Patent Act in 1988 to provide that refus[ing] to . . . use any
rights to the patent does not equate to misuse or illegal
extension of the patent.233 The legislative history behind the
amendment makes clear that Congress intended it to codify the
Second Circuits holding that refusing to use a patent does not
violate antitrust law.234
Despite the long-held understanding that the exercise of
patent rightsincluding non-use of a patentis immune from
antitrust scrutiny, the Second Circuit has now decided that the
exercise of patent rights is not protected if it interfere[s] with
competition beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.235
However, conduct clearly within the scope of patent rights
should not violate antitrust laws simply because it makes
competition for generics tougher later. Much of the patent
holders conduct during the patent period, such as marketing to
prescribers and TV advertising campaigns, is aimed at building
brand loyalty that will make competition tougher for
generics.236 Moreover, many patent rightssuch as the right to
permit an authorized generichinder competitors efforts to
232. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
233. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012)).
234. See 134 CONG. REC. 32,29395 (Oct. 20, 1988) (statement by primary
sponsor Rep. Kastenmeier) (citing SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195
(2d Cir. 1981)).
235. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 660 (2d
Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948)).
This aspect of the Second Circuits decision creates a conflict with the Federal
Circuit that held in King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, that a patentee can
choose not to exercise its patent. See King Instruments Corp., 65 F.3d at 950.
236. See, e.g., LEIGH PURVIS & STEPHEN W. SCHONDELMEYER, AARP PUB.
POLY INST., RX PRICE WATCH CASE STUDY: EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE IMPACT
OF GENERIC COMPETITION FOR LIPITOR (2013), http://www.aarp.org/content
/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/health/2013/lipitor-final-report-
AARP-ppi-health.pdf. The strategies used by brand drug manufacturer Pfizer
to reduce the impact of generic competition for Lipitor, including marketing
expenditures in excess of $659 million during the twelve months prior to
patent expiration. As a result of these strategies, brand Lipitor was expected
to generate some $3 billion of sales for Pfizer in 2015 despite being more than
three years past patent expiration. Jeff Bailey, Pfizers Projected $3B Drug:
Name Will Shock You, FORBES (July 9, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/ycharts/2013/07/09/pfizers-projected-3b-drug-name-will-shock-you/.
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compete.237 Patent rights are granted for the entire patent
period; they should not be truncated during the patent term to
benefit competitors after the patent has expired. In fact,
truncating the patent rights in this way would clearly be in
conflict with the Hatch-Waxman provisions that extend the
patent period to protect brand manufacturers profitability.238
Finally, despite evidence that a one-a-day drug can
improve medication adherence, reduce caregiver burdens, and
save healthcare costs,239 the Second Circuit concluded that any
procompetitive benefits do not justify the anticompetitive
effects of Forests replacement of Namenda IR with Namenda
XR.240 Regardless of the merits of this conclusion, courts have
repeatedly concluded that competition law is not the
appropriate instrument to evaluate product design and
innovation, and courts are not equipped to weigh the benefits to
consumers of a new product against the costs of any
anticompetitive effects: To weigh the benefits of an improved
product design against the resulting injuries to competitors is
not just unwise, it is unadministrable. There are no criteria
that courts can use to calculate the right amount of
innovation, which would maximize social gains and minimize
237. See FED. TRADE COMMN, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM
EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM IMPACT iii (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-
and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission/authorized-generic-
drugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-
commission.pdf (Competition from AGs during the 180-day exclusivity period
has the potential to reduce both generic drug prices and generic firm
revenues . . . . 180-day exclusivity does not preclude a brand-name company
from entering with its own generic . . . during that exclusivity period. Brand-
name companies now frequently launch an AG to compete with the first-
filer.).
238. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012).
239. Matthew Falagas et al., Compliance with Once-Daily Versus Twice or
Thrice-Daily Administration of Antibiotic Regimens: A Meta-Analysis of
Randomized Controlled Trials, PLOS ONE, Jan. 2015, at e0116207 ([T]his
meta-analysis showed that compliance to treatment appears to be higher with
once than multiple daily dosing regimens.); ROBBIE NIEUWLAAT ET AL.,
COCHRANE COLLABORATION, INTERVENTIONS FOR ENHANCING MEDICATION
ADHERENCE 3 (2014), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002
/14651858.CD000011.pub4/epdf (Low patient adherence is a major barrier to
realizing the benefits of medications that have been shown to do more good
than harm in clinical trials.); see also Brief of Defendants Actavis, supra note
210, at 17.
240. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 65859.
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competitive injury.241 Antitrust scholars have long recognized
the undesirability of having courts oversee product design, and
any dampening of technological innovation would be at cross-
purposes with antitrust law.242 Even the Second Circuit has
admitted no one can determine with any reasonable assurance
whether one product is superior.243 However, in New York ex
rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, the Second Circuit changed
course and decided it was qualified to make the decision that
Namenda XRs superiority over Namenda IR was insufficient to
justify any harms to generic competitors. As I discuss in the
next section, such decisions will cause harm to innovation and
consumers in the long run.
In sum, Forests replacement of Namenda IR with
Namenda XR was the predictable business response to the
incentives created by patent law and state substitution laws. It
was within Forests patent rights to stop marketing Namenda
IR during its patent period, and removing an obsolete product
from market when there is a new and improved version is not
consumer coercion. After the patent period, consumers could
and would have switched to generic IR because of the
significant cost savings. Although removing Namenda IR from
market may have made competition tougher for generics by
making them engage in their own marketing, it certainly did
241. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592
F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010). In weighing the procompetitive benefits of the
replacement of Namenda IR against the anticompetitive effects, the Second
Circuit has created a conflict with the Ninth Circuit. See Cal. Comput Prods.,
Inc. v. Intl Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) (IBM,
assuming it was a monopolist, had the right to redesign its products to make
them more attractive to buyerswhether by reason of lower manufacturing
cost and price or improved performance. It was under no duty to help
CalComp or other peripheral equipment manufacturers survive or expand.
IBM need not have provided its rivals with disk products to examine and copy,
nor have constricted its product development so as to facilitate sales of rival
products. The reasonableness of IBMs conduct in this regard did not present a
jury issue. (citation omitted)); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Intl Bus.
Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (Where there is a
difference of opinion as to the advantages of two alternatives which can both
be defended from an engineering standpoint, the court will not allow itself to
be enmeshed in a technical inquiry into the justifiability of product
innovations. (quoting Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537
F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976))), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. Intl Bus.
Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
242. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
243. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir.
1979).
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not bar generics from several existing cost-efficient means of
distribution. Generics often engage in their own marketing and
Forests actions would not have affected a primary source of
generics customersbeneficiaries that are channeled to
cheaper generic drugs by drug plans and PBMs.
Product replacement in pharmaceutical markets is not per
se anticompetitive. It should only give rise to anticompetitive
claims if combined with some other wrongful conduct, such as
fabricating safety concerns or falsely disparaging a product,244
or if the new product is clearly a sham innovation. As Senior
Judge Douglas Ginsburg and then-FTC Commissioner Joshua
D. Wright recently recommended in their review of the New
York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC decision: [W]e
respectfully recommend against imposing a competition law
sanction on product switching absent clear and convincing
objective evidence that Product B represents a sham innovation
with zero or negative consumer welfare benefits.245 As I
explain in the next section, extending anticompetitive claims
beyond this threatens innovation and will harm consumers in
the long run.
B. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DUTY CREATED INNEW
YORK EX REL. SCHNEIDERMAN V. ACTAVIS PLC
With New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, the
Second Circuit has created a new duty for pharmaceutical
companies to continue manufacturing and selling an obsolete
drug in order to help future generic competitors. The court
believed that forcing Forest to continue selling Namenda IR
would help future generic entrants capture a significant
portion of the prescriptions that might otherwise have gone to
Namenda XR. This unprecedented duty requires Forest to do
business in a way that hurts its future profits. In essence, the
court has taken the business operations of a pharmaceutical
company, which violates the economic freedoms and capitalist
principles this country is founded upon. The only other
244. See In re: Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naxolone)
Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2014) ([S]imply introducing
a new product on the market . . . does not, by itself, constitute exclusionary
conduct. The key question is whether the defendant combined the introduction
of a new product with some other wrongful conduct . . . .).
245. Joshua D. Wright, U.S. Fed. Trade Commr & Judge Douglas H.
Ginsburg, supra note 103, at 1.
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situation in which the government has thought it appropriate
to potentially control the business operations of a
pharmaceutical company involve national defense
emergencies.246 Is facilitating generic drug company profits
upon market entry really tantamount to saving lives in
national emergencies?
Although the court intended this new duty to benefit
consumers and lower health care spending, the actual effects of
the ruling will likely be the opposite of these intentions.
Requiring pharmaceutical companies to continue marketing
superseded drugs so that generic competitors can take many of
their customers reduces incentives for innovation. The Second
Circuit assumes that innovation will not be harmed, and may
even be helped if companies focus on developing riskier, but
medically significant innovations instead of trivial or minor
product reformulations.247 However, this conclusion overlooks
the fact that most innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is
incremental, creating new products that expand therapeutic
classes, increase available dosing options, remedy physiological
interactions of known medicines, or improve other properties of
existing medicines.248 According to analysis of FDA data, two-
thirds of new drug approvals are for incremental
innovations.249 These drugs contain the same active ingredients
as other products on the market, but differ in dosage form,
route of administration, or are combined with another active
ingredient.250 And according to the World Health Organization,
over sixty percent of drugs deemed necessary for combating
prevalent diseases are the result of incremental innovations.251
246. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,603, 77 Fed. Reg. 16651 (Mar. 16, 2012)
(authorizing requisition of industrial and technological production to secure
the national defense).
247. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 659 (2d
Cir. 2015).
248. See INTL FEDN OF PHARMACEUTICAL MFRS. & ASSNS, INCREMENTAL
INNOVATION: ADAPTING TO PATIENT NEEDS 11 fig.3 (2013),
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Publication/2013/IFPMA_Incremental
_Innovation_Feb_2013_Low-Res.pdf (showing a higher number of new drugs
are improvements to existing drugs rather than original drugs).
249. NATL INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH & EDUC. FOUND.,
CHANGING PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 3 (2002).
250. Id.
251. See J. Cohen, L. Cabanilla & J. Sosnov, Role of Follow-On Drugs and
Indications on the WHO Essential Drug List, 31 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY &
THERAPEUTICS 585, 58991 (2006).
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Unfortunately, the Second Circuits ruling may deter these
important incremental innovations.
Moreover, commandeering brand manufacturers
operations and preventing them from operating in a profit-
maximizing way may harm innovation and drug development
throughout the pharmaceutical industry.252 Brand
manufacturers are largely responsible for pharmaceutical
innovation.253 Since 2000, brand companies have spent over
half a trillion dollars on R&D,254 and they currently account for
over ninety percent of the spending on the clinical trials
necessary to bring new drugs to market.255 As a result of this
spending, over 500 new drugs have been approved by the FDA
since 2000,256 and another 5000 are currently in development
in the United States.257 Forcing brand manufacturers to keep
superseded products on the market and lose sales decreases the
companies profitability and reduces their ability to engage in
this expensive research and development.
Less R&D spending will result in less innovation
throughout the industry. Indeed, a substantial body of
empirical literature establishes a direct relationship between
pharmaceutical firms profitability, research and development
efforts, and innovation. Numerous studies have found that
policies that increase pharmaceutical profitability lead to
increases in new clinical trials, new molecular entities, and
new drug offerings.258 Other studies have found that policies
252. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 139, at 2733 (noting that
funding of federal research and development priorities in the pharmaceutical
sector is sometimes correlated with less innovation and drug development
overall); Kenneth A. Getz, Sizing up the Clinical Research Market, APPLIED
CLINICAL TRIALS (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com
/sizing-clinical-research-market (noting that governmental research and
development funding can be unrelated to private development of
investigational drugs and devices).
253. See, e.g., Kenneth I. Kaitin, Natalie R. Bryant & Louis Lasagna, The
Role of the Research-Based Pharmaceutical Industry in Medical Progress in
the United States, 33 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 412, 412 (1993) (noting that
from 1981 through 1990, 92% of new drugs were discovered by private
branded companies).
254. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS OF AM., supra note 11, at i, 35
36.
255. Id. at 26.
256. Id. at 13.
257. Id. at vi.
258. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Linn, Market Size in Innovation:
Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1049,
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that reduce expected profitability lead to decreases in R&D
spending.259 Thus, the Second Circuits opinion that forces
brand companies to operate in a way that reduces profitability
over the long term could very well lead to less R&D and less
innovation in the pharmaceutical market.
The consequences of this reduced innovation will be felt by
consumers. Research shows that pharmaceutical innovation
has produced significant health benefits to consumers.
Empirical estimates of the benefits of pharmaceutical
innovation indicate that each new drug brought to market
saves 11,200 life-years each year.260 Another study finds that
the health improvements from each new drug can eliminate
$19 billion in lost wages by preventing lost work due to
illness.261 Moreover, because new effective drugs reduce
medical spending on doctor visits, hospitalizations, and other
medical procedures, data show that for every incremental one
dollar spent on new drugs, total medical spending decreases by
106876 (2004) (finding that increases in market size due to demographic
shifts correlate with increases in drug innovation); Mark Duggan & Fiona M.
Scott Morton, The Distortionary Effects of Government Procurement: Evidence
from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1, 2023 (2006)
(finding that new drug introductions increase as Medicaid coverage increases);
Amy Finkelstein, Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy: Evidence from
the Vaccine Industry, 119 Q.J. ECON. 527, 54249 (2004) (finding that policy
changes increasing vaccination requirements led to an increase in new vaccine
clinical trials and new vaccines).
259. See, e.g., Joseph Golec, Shantaram Hegde & John A. Vernon,
Pharmaceutical R&D Spending and Threats of Price Regulation, 45 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 239, 24447 (2010) (finding that proposed legislation
to cap or limit drug prices and health care spending correlated with drops in
pharmaceutical research and development investment); Frank R. Lichtenberg,
Public Policy and Innovation in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, in PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE ECONOMICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 83, 95107 (Douglas
Holtz-Eakin & Harvey S. Rosen eds., 2004) (finding that government policies
to increase generic drug development and to cap drug prices reduced the value
of launching a new drug and reduced the amount of research and development
spending on innovation).
260. Frank R. Lichtenberg, Columbia Univ. & Natl Bureau of Econ.
Research, Conference Presentation on the Economic Value of Medical
Research, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Mortality Reduction, and Economic
Growth 2728 (Dec. 23, 1999), http://m.laskerfoundation.org/media
/pdf/pharmaceuticalimrec.pdf.
261. Craig L. Garthwaite, The Economic Benefits of Pharmaceutical
Innovations: The Case of Cox-2 Inhibitors, AMER. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON.,
July 2012, at 116, 13335.
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more than seven dollars.262 Brand companies, and the profit-
incentives that motivate them, are largely responsible for
pharmaceutical innovation. Thus, actions that reduce brand
innovation will have long-term negative effects on consumer
health and health care spending.
The Second Circuit intended to benefit consumers by
facilitating generic entry into the IR market and lowering drug
prices. However, the precedent set by the court, if left
undisturbed, may reduce innovation and increase health care
spending. These long-term negative consequences will likely far
outweigh any short-term benefits to consumers from
marginally-lower prices for memantine drugs. As Senior Judge
Douglas Ginsburg and then-FTC Commissioner Joshua D.
Wright recently declared in their review of the New York ex rel.
Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC decision:
Relying upon a competition agency to engage in ex post valuation of
a product design change and weigh it against the reduction in
competition and the resulting anticompetitive effects can only reduce
the incentive to innovate or distort those incentives towards
blockbuster innovations rather than reformulations that may result
in incremental but significant consumer benefits.263
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hatch-Waxman Act was careful to balance the
incentives for brand innovation with the benefits of generic
entry. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC upsets
that balance by creating a duty for brand drug companies to
continue selling superseded drugs in order to assist the
marketing efforts of generic companies. This duty is especially
inappropriate given the current regulatory environment that
many argue is already stacked against brand companies.264
Whereas brand companies spend an average of $2.6 billion to
bring new drugs to market, the truncated approval process
created for generics costs them only $1 to $2 million.265 State
substitution laws allow generic drugs to be automatically
substituted by pharmacists when patients present a
prescription for a brand drug, allowing generics to free-ride off
262. Frank R. Lichtenberg, Benefits and Costs of Newer Drugs: An Update,
28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 485, 48788 (2007).
263. Joshua D. Wright, U.S. Fed. Trade Commr & Judge Douglas H.
Ginsburg, supra note 103, at 3.
264. Higgins & Graham, supra note 140, at 371.
265. See sources cited supra notes 2834.
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of the marketing and promotion efforts of brand companies.266
And, insurance plans and PBMs channel beneficiaries to
generics through the use of formularies and powerful pricing
incentives. As a result of these policies and efforts, generic
drugs now account for over eighty-four percent of prescriptions
filled.267
If expanded by future courts, or even left undisturbed, the
duty created in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC
creates a significant new obstacle to brand companies
profitability and incentives to innovate. Brand companies will
be required to leave obsolete products on the market, and in
doing so, hand over eighty to ninety percent of their sales
directly to generic competitors.268 By preventing companies
from shifting customers to new products, and forcing them to
lose money to generic competitors, the decision reduces
incentives to innovate. Any decrease in innovation will harm
consumers health outcomes and increase medical spending in
the long run.
Moreover, the New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis
PLC decision leaves open many questions. At what point in the
patent period is the removal of an obsolete product not
considered anticompetitive? How much marketing and
distribution of obsolete products is required under the ruling?
Are soft switches still allowed? How innovative does a product
have to be for courts to decide that the procompetitive benefits
outweigh any anticompetitive costs? Will future courts extend
the injunction period beyond one month after generic entry?
Until these and other questions are resolved, brand
manufacturers operate in a world of uncertainty and under the
constant threat of litigation for decisions they make when
introducing new products.
266. See sources cited supra notes 30, 152.
267. See IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 137.
268. See DeRuiter & Holston, supra note 29.
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